作者：林喜芬
作者介绍：上海交通大学凯原法学院副教授，法学博士
出版日期：2016年12月9日
内容提要 通过对我国A市B法院减刑程序的运行实践(以1702份减刑裁定书为样本)进行实证研究及针对减刑实务人员的深度访谈得到具体数据。2013年以前数据显示,因职务犯罪、金融类犯罪等被定罪的三类罪犯的减刑系数较大,即在较短的时间内能获得较长时间的减刑。该发现一定程度上符合当事人能力理论,即在法律程序中,那些有钱人或有权人由于可以调动更多的社会资源,因此更容易在法律程序中胜出或占据优势。此外,减刑规范的模糊性和减刑程序的非公开性也一定程度上解释了"减刑阿富贵"的实证现象。2014—2015年的数据显示,在中央司法政策、规则修订及地方试点的合力作用下,针对三类罪犯的减刑系数反而表现出陡然下降的趋势,且低于非三类罪犯的减刑系数。我国严格控制三类罪犯减刑的实践效果一定程度上挑战了当事人能力理论的普适性,也启发研究者进一步关注中国司法理性化的模式及其可持续性问题。而要走出运动式治理的框架,需寄希望于技术监测进路,而非资源配给进路或单纯的程序机制改良。
关键词 减刑 “三类罪犯”司法公平 运动式治理 正当程序
Abstract: The exact data was obtained after the empirical research on the operation practice (with 1702 commutation verdicts as samples) of commutation procedure of court B in city A of China and deep interviews with staffs working on the commutation. The data before 2013 shows that convicted criminals of three types including duty crime and financial crime have great commutation possibility, that is, acquiring the commutation of long time within a short period of time. To a certain extent, the finding is consistent with the capacity theory of the party, namely, as rich or powerful people have many social resources, they have advantages to win in legal proceedings. In addition, the blurry commutation norms and closed-door commutation procedures also explain the phenomenon. With the revision of the judicial policies and rules of central government and the pilot programs of local departments, the data from 2014 to 2015 reveals a tendency of sudden drop in the commutation of the crimes of the three types, which is even lower than other crimes. The strict control of the three types' commutations not only partly challenges the capacity theory of the party, but also arouses researchers' further attention to the model of Chinese judicial rationalization and its sustainability. However, in order to get rid of the sporadic campaigns of law enforcement, technical monitoring approach needs to be applied, instead of resource allocation or procedural reform.