作者：章武生
作者介绍：复旦大学法学院教授
出版日期：2017年4月9日
内容提要 我国证券市场虚假陈述、内幕交易、操纵股价等大规模侵权事件频发,但由于行政监管和司法救济乏力,遭受损失的投资者往往投诉无门,很难获得有效的救济。增设对证券市场侵权者威慑力极强的退出制证券集团诉讼制度在我国不仅具有必要性,而且具有可行性。我国目前已经具备了建立退出制证券集团诉讼制度的环境和技术条件。同时,导致美国集团诉讼负面作用较大的因素,有的在我国并不存在,例如错综复杂的双重法院制度;有的在我国比较容易得到控制,例如巨额的律师费用和好讼的法律文化。从现实情况来看,我国增设证券退出制集团诉讼的价值可能会远远大于美国等发达国家,其弊端则可能明显小于上述国家。
关键词 集团诉讼 证券集团诉讼 加入制退出制
Abstract: Large-scale tort affairs such as false statement, insider trading and manipulating the share price frequently happen in Chinese security market. However, since the ineffective administrative supervision and judicial relief, investors who suffer losses usually have no place to complaint, and are difficult to obtain effective relief. It is necessary and manageable to establish the security group litigation system with exit mechanism which is forceful to infringers in the security market. At present, our country has the environment and technology to establish this system. At the same time, some of the elements including complex double court systems which lead to negative function of American group litigation do not exist in China, and some elements such as large amount of lawyer cost and legal civilization of being keen on litigation are easy to be controlled. In reality, establishing the security group litigation system with exit mechanism in China is probably more valuable than developed countries including the US, and its disadvantages maybe less than those countries.