Mo Zhi
To strengthen the regulation of controlling shareholders and actual controllers (dual controllers), China’s Company Law of 2024 introduces deemed director provisions (DDPs) in articles 180 and 192. Through legal fiction, fiduciary duty and joint liability can be imposed directly on dual controllers without legal directorship, thereby addressing the accountability gaps caused by traditional status-based imputation. However, the DDPs face the implementation challenge due to the openness of key terms like ‘actually executing company affairs’ and ‘instructing’, coupled with the need for a precise review standard by judges when making determinations. It is essential to adopt a flexible system approach in judicial interpretation by the Supreme People’s Court. The system comprises three elements: formality, diligence, and reliance, which correspond to the principles of separate legal personality, parity of power and accountability, and equitable protection of interests. Through segmented evaluation and complementary interaction of the elements, this approach will provide judges with a relatively clear framework to avoid arbitrary adjudication and preserve the adaptability of the DDPs to complex business realities.
内容提要 为强化对控股股东与实际控制人的规制，中国《公司法》在第180条和第192条引入了实质董事条款。通过法律拟制，信义义务与连带责任可直接施加于无合法董事职位的双控人，从而解决传统上基于身份带来的问责鸿沟。然而，由于“实际执行公司事务”和“指示”等核心概念的开放性，加之法官在认定时需要清晰的审查标准，条款面临施行上的挑战。为此，有必要在最高人民法院的司法解释中采取动态系统论。该系统包含了程式、勤勉和信赖三个评价要素，分别对应法人格独立、权责对等与利益公平保护等规范原则。基于要素的分段式评价与互补式协同，动态系统论将给予法官相对明确的框架来避免裁判的肆意，并保持实质董事条款对复杂的商业现实的适应能力。