作者：林鸿潮
作者介绍：中国政法大学法治政府研究院副教授，法学博士
出版日期：2014年8月9日
内容提要 公共危机管理中的问责制是对官员的一种激励机制，同时具有回应社会压 力的政治功能。问责制中归责原则的确定应当体现结果导向，满足激励约束，并适当权衡 民意。现行规范文本中的归责原则，无论单独还是选择性地适用都无法满足上述要求，既 有的理论成果也没有回答这一问题。过错责任仍然是构建归责原则的起点，但应当针对不 同情形加以修正或调整。对于官员的履职方式已经被法律具体化的情形应当适用违法责 任，但允许官员以不存在过错进行抗辩; 对于官员拥有裁量自由的情形应当以重大过错为 归责原则，但也应允许官员进行免责抗辩; 对于小概率、高级别、造成重大损失的非常规突 发事件，可以基于政治考量适用结果责任。
关键词 公共危机管理 问责制 归责原则
Abstract: The accountability in public crisis management is an incentive mechanism for officials，and has function of political response to social pressure． The doctrine of liability fixation in that accountability should be result oriented，meet incentive constraints and reflect public opinion moderately． But whether single or selective application of doctrine of liability fixation in current normative documents cannot meet the above requirements and existing research achievements have not answered this question yet． The liability for fault is still the origin of constructing doctrine of liability fixation，but it should be revised or adjusted according to different circumstances． In the instance that the methods for officials to executive their duties has been specified by law，liability for illegality should be proper，but officials should stand a chance to defend on the grounds of no fault． If officials have more discretion， liability for serious fault will be appropriate but defenses for liability exemption are still necessary． Liability for result can only be applied to small probability，high level，and great losses extreme crisis based on political considerations．