作者：傅穹
作者介绍：吉林大学理论法学研究中心、法学院教授
出版日期：2022年12月9日
内容提要 作为提升公司长期价值的公司利益，保障着公司多方参与者的整体利益实现，是平衡公司各主体利益冲突的价值工具。公司利益最大化作为董事的行为准则，有助于全体股东和其他利益相关者共同获益。董事角色“机构说”最利于实现公司利益，董事之间相互监督不意味着承担横向义务。董事勤勉义务改革应凸显理性人假定的差异化标准，矫正董事催缴连带责任的不当扩张，填补授权资本制下董事公平对待义务的缺失，增加董事合规监督义务，允许章程豁免或适度限缩勤勉责任。董事忠实义务改革应从严格的禁止模式转向缓和的利益冲突平衡模式，完善自我交易、公司机会、同业竞争与高管薪酬的规则，提供违反忠实义务的多元化救济路径。公司利益范式不仅提供了董事义务改革的全新解释框架，而且重塑了面向本土商事特质的董事义务规则体系。
关键词 公司利益 勤勉义务 忠实义务 授权资本制 公司治理
Abstract: The company’s interests that enhance the company’s long-term value represent the overall interests of the company’s multi-party participants and become a value tool to balance the conflicts of interests of various subjects in the company. Directors act on the principle of maximizing the company’s interests, which will benefit all shareholders and other related ones. The ‘organization theory’ of the director’s role is the most beneficial to the realization of the company’s interests, and the mutual supervision among directors does not mean that they have horizontal obligations. The reform of directors’ diligence obligations should reshape the different standards assumed by rational people, correct the prejudice of improper expansion of directors’ duty of diligence, fill the gap of directors’ fair treatment obligations under the authorized capital system, increase directors’ compliance and supervision obligations, and the liability of diligence is exempted or moderately restricted by the articles of association. The reform of directors’ duty of loyalty should be changed from the strict prohibition mode to the moderate interest conflict balancing mode, perfect the rules of self-dealing, corporate opportunity, horizontal competition and executive compensation, and provide multiple remedies for breach of duty of loyalty. The paradigm of corporate interests not only provides a new explanation framework for the reform of the director’s duty, but also remodels the system of directors’ obligations oriented to local commercial characteristics.