作者：潘林
作者介绍：山东大学法学院副教授，法学博士
出版日期：2022年2月9日
内容提要 特定法域的“主义之争”有其特殊的阶段、问题甚至概念，股东会中心主义的当代意义更是对机关分化不足的确认，经理中心主义则提示了董事会与经理分权的弹性。我国公司业务决策权力在机关之间分割，缺失决策权威与权力中心，造成了公司业务中决策主体的缺位、义务设定的落空和责任识别的困难。司法对公司行为的评价囿于决策问题本身而非“机关的决策”，从而加重了司法判断的负担，难以实现取向决策程序的方法论变迁，难以通过信义义务实现贴合交易语境的审查。对公司机关决策权属规范的再造，应首先明确董事会作为公司业务权力中心，从而将公司行为的评价难题转化为通过信义义务的决策责任追究问题，同时应在贯通权责逻辑的前提下为封闭公司保留分权的自由度。
关键词 股东会中心主义 董事会中心主义 经理中心主义 权力中心 信义义务
Abstract: The debate over the center of corporate decision-making power has different stages, problems, and even concepts in different jurisdictions. The modern significance of shareholder-centric is more the identification for insufficiency of corporate organ division than anything else, and manager-centric indicates the flexibility of the division of power between the board and managers. The corporate business decision-making power is divided among corporate organs with no authority or center in corporate law of China, which leads to the problems of vacancy of decision-making subject, failure of fiduciary duty, and difficulty of determining liability. Judicial review of corporate behavior is limited to the business decision itself instead of corporate organ’s business decision-making, which adds to the judicial judgment burden and makes it difficult to focus on the decision-making process and combine with the transactional context through fiduciary duty. The board shall be defined as the center to reform the division of decision-making power among corporate organs. Thus, the evaluation of corporate behavior could be turned into decision-making accountability on the ground of fiduciary duty. Meanwhile, the freedom of power division shall be reserved for close corporations with the precondition of power and accountability.