作者：吕成龙
作者介绍：深圳大学法学院长聘副教授，法学博士
出版日期：2024年2月9日
内容提要 证监会以行政监管的方式逐渐介入到公司治理之中，形成了目前证券监管主导上市公司治理的格局。这不仅使得证券法与公司法的功能出现重叠，而且在个别规则上产生差异，引致行政监管目标扰动公司法规则、监管资源过度陷入公司事务、影响市场自律管理等内在冲突。信息是证券市场产品质量的核心载体，信息对称标准理应成为判断证券监管介入公司治理限度的核心工具，即除规制证券市场交易秩序外，证券监管应当聚焦于消弭涉及上市公司治理、业务经营与股份变化重要事项的信息不对称程度。只有以此为目标，证券监管才能在特定条件下，以最大克制程度的实体性规则加以介入。在判断是否介入时，需循序考量对象适格性、潜在影响、标准程度和矫正效益四项要件。信息对称标准除理论上有助于界分公司法与证券法的制度功能外，还有助于优化证券法与公司法之间的动态与静态联动关系，借助于立法模式转变与规则制定的全流程审查，最终将为改善现有证券监管介入公司治理模式提供参考。
关键词 证券监管 信息对称标准 上市公司治理 公司法 证券法
Abstract: The China Securities Regulatory Commission has increasingly intervened in corporate governance through administrative regulation. This intervention has led to a situation where securities regulation dominates the governance of listed companies. This not only causes an overlap in the functions of securities law and corporate law, but also leads to discrepancies in individual rules. These discrepancies can disturb rules of corporate law, excessively entangle regulatory resources in corporate affairs, and impact market self-regulation. Information is the core carrier of product quality in the securities market, and the standard of information symmetry should be the core tool for determ ining the extent of securities regulatory intervention in corporate governance. In addition to regulating the order of securities market transactions, securities regulation should focus on mitigating the asymmetry Abstract: The China Securities Regulatory Commission has increasingly intervened in corporate governance through administrative regulation. This intervention has led to a situation where securities regulation dominates the governance of listed companies. This not only causes an overlap in the functions of securities law and corporate law, but also leads to discrepancies in individual rules. These discrepancies can disturb rules of corporate law, excessively entangle regulatory resources in corporate affairs, and impact market self-regulation. Information is the core carrier of product quality in the securities market, and the standard of information symmetry should be the core tool for determining the extent of securities regulatory intervention in corporate governance. In addition to regulating the order of securities market transactions, securities regulation should focus on mitigating the asymmetry in significant issues related to the governance, business operations, and share changes of listed companies. Only with this goal can securities regulation intervene under specific conditions with the maximum restraint through substantive rules. In deciding whether to intervene, the factors of target suitability, potential impact, standard level, and corrective benefits should be considered sequentially. Beyond theoretically helping to delineate the institutional functions of corporate law and securities law, the standard of information symmetry can optimize the dynamic and static interaction between securities law and corporate law. Through a shift in legislative models and a comprehensive review of rule-making processes, these considerations will provide references for improving the current model of securities regulatory intervention in corporate governance.
