作者：赖虹宇
作者介绍：西南财经大学法学院副教授，法学博士
出版日期：2023年8月9日
内容提要 金融机构股东加重责任关乎股东私人利益与社会公共利益之平衡。域外股东加重责任来源于风险防范语境下的公私合作治理需求，控股公司结构决定了加重责任虽然对有限责任有所偏离，但具有私法逻辑支撑。我国的股东加重责任覆盖了整个金融行业，并聚焦于主要股东而不限于控股股东，在范围与对象两个维度上呈现出扩张现象。此种扩张具有现实合理性，但对私法秩序形成挑战并引致诸多规范困境，亟待立法回应。但特定行业立法无法应对此种扩张，金融稳定法的公法定位也难以直接填补私法基础。而公司法则能作为规范我国特殊实践的立法载体，实现法律层面设定、覆盖整个金融行业、契合公私合作治理、补足私法正当性等多重目标，并可合体系地针对金融控股公司进行差异化的规则设计。
关键词 股东加重责任 金融控股公司 金融稳定法 公司法
Abstract: The shareholder’s enhanced obligation of financial institutions is related to the balance between shareholders’ private interests and public interests. The rules abroad stem from the need for public-private partnership governance in risk prevention. The structure of the holding company determines the enhanced obligation deviates from limited liability while depends on private law. At the same time, the shareholder’s enhanced obligation covers the entire financial industry and focuses on major shareholders rather than controlling shareholders in China. This kind of expansion is the result of the motivation of maintaining f inancial security, the pragmatic legislation, and the situation of corporate governance where shareholders abuse their rights. Industry-specific legislation cannot cope with this expansion, and the public law positioning of financial stability law cannot directly fill the foundation in private law. The company law can be used as a legislative carrier in response to special practice in China, to achieve multiple goals such as setting at the legal level, covering the entire financial industry, conforming to public-private partnership governance, and supplementing the legitimacy of private law, and systematically targeting the differentiated rule design for financial holding companies.