作者：梁上上
作者介绍：清华大学法学教授，博士生导师
出版日期：2019年4月9日
内容提要 我国现行的清算义务人制度是基于中国的实际情况而产生的法律制度,对保护债权人利益具有重要意义。现行《公司法》及其《公司法司法解释(二)》将有限公司股东作为清算义务人,使股东责任从有限责任变为无限责任,致使股东与债权人之间利益关系的失衡,已经摧毁了我国的市场退出法律体系。基于股东、董事、监事、直接责任人等在公司治理结构中地位、职权等的比较分析可以看出,有限公司的清算义务人不是股东,只有董事才是妥当的清算义务人。现行制度根源于对公司解散效力等一系列制度的误解,已造成债权人从破产清算向非破产清算逃逸,损害了股东利益。保护债权人利益的正道在于,继续保留清算义务人制度,增设董事的破产申请义务。
关键词 股东 董事 清算 清算义务人 解散
Abstract: China's current liquidation obligor system is a legal system based on the actual situation in China and is of great significance for protecting the interests of creditors. The current Company Law and its Judicial Interpretation ( II) will use the shareholders of the company as liquidation obligors, and change the shareholder's responsibility from limited liability to unlimited liability, resulting in an imbalance of interests between shareholders and creditors, which has destroyed the legal system of market withdrawal in China. Based on the comparative analysis of the status and powers of shareholders, directors, supervisors, and directly responsible persons in the corporate governance structure, it can be seen that the liquidation obligor of a limited company is not a shareholder, and only the director is a proper liquidation obligor. The current system is rooted in the misunderstanding of a series of systems such as the effectiveness of the company's dissolution, which has caused creditors to escape from bankruptcy liquidation to non-bankruptcy liquidation, and damage the interests of shareholders. The correct way to protect the interests of creditors is to continue to retain the liquidation obligor system and to increase the bankruptcy filing obligations of directors.