作者：王晓晔
作者介绍：湖南大学法学院教授，博士生导师
出版日期：2015年12月9日
内容提要 专利一旦成为广泛应用的标准必要专利，权利人一般得向标准化组织承诺 以公平、合理和无歧视的 FＲAND 条件实施许可。尽管 FＲAND 许可条件是对专利权人的 约束，但因这个承诺没有可操作性，现在有越来越多涉及标准必要专利的案件进入了反垄 断执法机构和法院。华为诉 IDC 一案说明，标准必要专利与一般专利相比具有特殊性，必 要专利权人在其专利许可市场占支配地位，权利人收取过高的专利许可费或者请求法院制 止专利侵权的行为可能被视为滥用市场支配地位。涉及标准必要专利许可的案件凸显知 识产权法和反垄断法交叉领域的很多热点问题，从而也带给了我们很多思考，例如我国《反 垄断法》第 55 条第 1 句的规定是否具有合理性。
关键词 标准必要专利 市场支配地位 FＲAND 许可费 禁令请求 华为诉 IDC 案
Abstract: If patents have been widely used as standard essential patents ( SEPs) ，the holders of the SEPs normally have to make FＲAND commitments so that they will license their SEPs on fair，reasonable and non-discriminatory terms． Although the FＲAND commitments are constraint to the patentee，there are more and more disputes over FＲAND licensing and cases involving SEPs getting into antitrust enforcement agencies and courts due to these commitments are not workable． As demonstrated in case Huawei v． IDC，compared to normal patents，SEPs have special characters and their holders hold dominant position in patent licensing market，so it is easy for SEP owners to generate hold-up problems，for example to charge unreasonable royalty，or bring an action for a prohibitory injunction． The cases like Huawei v． IDC have brought many questions and thoughts at the crossroads of antitrust law and intellectual property law，for instance，whether the first sentence in the Article 55 of the Anti-monopoly Law is reasonable and correct．