作者：张晋藩 闫静怡
作者介绍：中国政法大学终身教授；燕山大学助理研究员，法学博士
出版日期：2025年12月9日
内容提要 中国古代治理经济的成文法在东周末年开始形成，并在后世发展，具有逐利性和隐名性。逐利性为内生特性，以国家财利收入为首要目的，与儒家思想和儒家化法律存在“义利”冲突。隐名性在历史发展中长期塑造而成，体现为名义上的依托性、内容上的治事性和运行上的嵌入性，它缓和了“义利”冲突，保障了古代经济管理法的长期存续和逐利功能的发挥。古代经济管理法的“逐利—隐名”二元特性辩证统一，共同构成了立体化的“阴阳相协”双螺旋结构。当下进一步整理研究中国古代经济管理法，有利于中华优秀传统法律文化的创造性转化和创新性发展。
关键词 中国古代经济管理法 逐利性 隐名性 优秀传统法律文化
Abstract: Statutory law for economic governance in ancient China began to take shape during the last years of the Eastern Zhou Dynasty and continued to develop in subsequent eras. It exhibits a profit-driven nature and a nominal-latent nature. The profit-driven nature is an endogenous characteristic, whose foremost objective is to increase state fiscal revenue. This brings it into tension with the ‘righteousness-profit debate’ central to Confucian thought and the Confucianized legal system. The nominal-latent nature is shaped gradually through historical development. It is manifested in nominal dependency, substantive focus on administrative practicality, and embeddedness in operation. The nominal-latent nature mitigates the ‘righteousness-profit debate’, ensures the longevity of ancient economic regulatory laws, and enables the continuous exercise of the revenue-generating function. The dual characteristics of ‘profit-driven and nominal-latent’ are dialectically unified, jointly forming a multidimensional dual helix structure of complementary opposites. Today, in-depth exploration of the ancient economic regulatory laws contributes to the creative transformation and innovative development of China’s excellent traditional legal culture.